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Weaknesses of
adjudication in the face
of secret evidence
By Gus Van Harten*
Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto
Abstract Since 2001, governments in Canada and the United Kingdom appear to
have increasingly sought to use secret evidence in proceedings against
individuals suspected of posing a security threat, relying on the courts to review
and legitimate executive claims in closed proceedings. Yet, in the face of secret
evidence, adjudicative decision-making is subject to several extraordinary
weaknesses. First, the judge is precluded from hearing additional information
that can come to light only if the individual or the public is aware of the
executive's claims. Secondly, courts are uniquely reliant on the executive to be
fair and forthcoming about confidential information and to characterise
accurately the case for secrecy. Thirdly, the dynamic or atmosphere of closed
proceedings may condition a judge to favour unduly the security interest over
priorities of accuracy and fairness. Even where the use of secret evidence is not
deemed to be irreparably unsafe or unfair, therefore, its admissibility must be
premised on the acknowledgement and careful consideration of corresponding
weaknesses in adjudication.
Keywords Closed proceedings; Confidentiality; National security; Judicial
reviewfl ecrecy is the source of a contradiction in the democratic state. While
secrecy may be essential to the state's ability to ensure security, it also
prevents citizens from making informed choices about how they wish to
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be governed.' Secrecy may be essential because the state must in some cases act in
confidence to protect against clandestine threats; put simply, in the words of a
judge of Canada's Federal Court, 'secrecy is required in order to counter the activ-
ities of those who operate in secret'. To entrust security to the state is therefore to
accept a measure of hidden government. Yet by precluding public scrutiny this
trust in the state makes official error and abuse more likely. Bentham described
publicity as 'the very soul ofjustice ... the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of
all guards against improbity' and there is no surer spark for cynicism about
government than the knowledge that those in power may lawfully conceal their
activities from outside scrutiny.4 For this reason, allowances for state secrecy call
for special mechanisms of accountability.
The tensions arising from secrecy inform much of the debate about the
relationship between national security and law. They reflect the underlying
conflict of interest in hidden government whereby those who wield security
powers also decide what to reveal to the public about their mistakes or misdeeds.'
This article focuses on how this conflict has the potential to infect the adjudicative
process where secret evidence6 is relied on, purportedly for security reasons, in
proceedings that affect an individual. Since 2001, governments appear to have
increasingly resorted to secret evidence in cases against those suspected of
involvement in terrorism and, as a result, courts have been asked in closed
proceedings to validate executive claims that an individual poses a security
threat.7 Such proceedings entail judicial review both of confidential information
1 J. S. Mill, On Liberty and Considerations of Representative Govecin ent (Penguin Books: London, 1974)
77-9.
2 E. Dawson, 'The Federal Court and the Clash of the Titans: Balancing Human Rights and National
Security' (2006) Address to the University of Manitoba Faculty of Law, 30 March 2006
<http :/cas-ncr-nterO3.cas-satj.gc.caiportal/page/portal/fc-cf en!Speeches>, accessed 16 October
2008.
3 J. Bentham, 'Draught of a New Plan for the Organization of the Judicial Establishment in France' in
The Works ofJereimy Bentharn, vol. 4 (Tait: Edinburgh, 1843) 316.
4 Note, 'Keeping Secrets: Congress, the Courts, and National Security Information' (1990) 103 Harv L
Rev 906 at 910-14.
5 M. Rankin, 'National Security: Information, Accountability, and the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service' (1986) 36 UTLJ 249 at 252; S. D.Jordan, 'Classified Information and Conflicts in
Independent Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing the Scales ofJustice after Iran-Contra' (1991) 91 Col L
Rev 1651 at 1654-5; E. K. Yamamoto, 'White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to
Hold the President Accountable for National Security Abuses' (2004) 68 Law & Contemp Probs 285
at 288-9.
6 'Secret evidence' is evidence to which the affected individual (and the public) is denied access;
'closed proceedings' are legal proceedings that permit secret evidence.
7 K. A. McKee, 'Remarks on the Freedom of Information Act: The "National Security" Exemption in a
Post 9/11 Era' (2007) 4 Regent J Int'l L 263 at 271-5; E. Yaroshefsky, 'Secret Evidence is Slowly
Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and FISA in the Courts' (2006) 34 Hoflstra L Rev 1063 at 1081-3.
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supplied by the state and of the state's arguments for secrecy. The aim of this
article is to examine the limitations of adjudication in the face of secret evidence.
The argument is pitched at the level of general principle and it does not aspire to
provide comprehensive treatment of existing case law in the United Kingdom or
Canada. Its reasoning is informed more eclectically by a distillation of academic
research and analysis, relevant case law, and the author's own experience in the
conduct of closed proceedings.
It is accepted here that it is appropriate for courts to decide whether secret
evidence should be allowed in judicial proceedings and, in turn, to assess secret
evidence against the applicable legal standards. In some contexts, especially that
of a criminal trial, constraints arising from secrecy will call for an adjudicator to
bar such evidence and to require the executive either to disclose the information
or to withdraw claims based on it. In other contexts, it may be desirable or permis-
sible to admit secret evidence in light of such factors as the centrality of the
evidence to the underlying case, the degree of impact on the individual's rights or
interests, and the utility and effectiveness of available procedural adaptations.
Once an initial decision is made that allowing secret evidence is not irreparably
unsafe or unfair, the courts must turn to more specific issues of relevance,
reliability, probity, and admissibility, and must scrutinise more precisely the
rationales for secrecy so as to decide whether and how portions or aspects of the
information can be disclosed to the affected individual or the public.8 In the
course of a more detailed review, it may become apparent that the required level
of secrecy is such that the original decision to allow a closed proceeding to go
forward should be revisited.
In considering secret evidence, the courts confront three key limitations. First, the
judge is foreclosed from hearing additional information and argument that can
come to light only if the affected individual or the public is made aware of the
executive's claims or the underlying record of confidential information. Secondly,
in closed proceedings, courts are especially reliant on executive officials to supply
and characterise confidential information and to justify the case for secrecy.
Thirdly, the dynamic of closed proceedings in the security context may condition
judges to favour unduly the interests of secrecy and security. These limitations do
not necessarily reflect inherent weaknesses of courts although they do require
that in some legal contexts-in light of the nature of the evidence and the
individual rights or interests at stake-secret evidence must be barred outright. On
the other hand, where the consequences for an individual are less serious, there is
an important role for adjudicative review of the security activities of the state and,
F8 Leigh, 'Secret Proceedings in Canada' (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall LJ 113 at 154.
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by extension, for secrecy. This role for adjudication as an accountability
mechanism should be endorsed only after consideration of the full range of limita-
tions that follow from the use of secret evidence.'
1. Adjudicative context
In recent years, the use of secret evidence in adjudicative proceedings involving
individuals accused or suspected of posing a security threat appears to have been
revived and intensified. Without undertaking systematic empirical analysis, this
section briefly outlines indicative aspects of the present use of secret evidence for
national security reasons in the United Kingdom and Canada and its judicial
review.
(a) Contemporary use of secret evidence
The underlying rationales for national security confidentiality have not changed
conceptually since 2001. These rationales arise mainly from the state's need to
protect the identity of informers in order to facilitate the gathering of human
source intelligence, to prevent the state's investigative activities and methods
from being revealed to those who pose a security threat, and to honour commit-
ments made to foreign governments as a condition of information sharing. These
rationales are well known and widely accepted as providing legitimate bases for
secrecy, while also raising the prospect of exaggeration and abuse. What has
changed since 2001 is the sense of urgency that is attached to relevant threats and
also, it would appear, the extent to which secret evidence may be introduced in
proceedings against an individual." This article leaves aside the extraordinary
measures adopted by the US government, including practices of rendition and
9 The authority of courts or other adjudicators to scrutinise executive decisions is also at times
limited, both in intensity and scope, by the application of a narrow standard of review or standard
of proof, or by the specified grounds for overturning decisions: Constitutional Affairs Committee,
The Operation of the Special Imm igration Appeals Comm ission (SIAC) and the Use of Special Advocates, HC
323-11 2004-05 (evidence of a number of Special Advocates) 57-9; Joint Committee on Human
Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policv and Human Rights: Draft Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 Order
(Continuance in force of sections I to 9), HL Paper 122, HC 915, 14 February 2006, paras 55-66. Although
not the focus of the present article, this attenuation of adjudicative review raises additional issues
concerning the accuracy and fairness of adjudicative decisions that are based on secret evidence.
Suffice it to say that such issues are another factor to consider in determining whether the
limitations inherent in closed proceedings can be ameliorated byprocedural adaptations designed
to accommodate secret evidence. However, even within a highly interventionist framework of
judicial review, the use of secret evidence raises nonetheless the limitations identified in the
present article.
10 J. L. Dratel, 'Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security Impair the
Defense of a Terrorism Case' (2003) 2 Cardozo Pub L, Policy & Ethics J 81 at 104.
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extra-judicial imprisonment," in order to highlight responses in the United
Kingdom and Canada that are not extra-judicial, but still irregular and troubling
in their reliance on closed proceedings.
The baseline for further analysis is that the overarching prohibition on secret
evidence in criminal proceedings remains well entrenched in the United Kingdom
and Canada in that the courts retain the authority to decide whether the public
interest calls for disclosure of evidence to an accused in order to protect the right
to a fair trial. That right itself rests fundamentally on the accused's ability to know
the case against him or her and to answer that case by testing the evidence and
offering evidence and argument in reply." In the criminal context, dangers posed
by secrecy to accuracy and fairness are often regarded as irreparable. Secrecy may
be permitted in the investigation of alleged crimes in order to authorise investi-
gative techniques aimed at acquiring disclosable evidence for trial, but it is rarely
if ever tolerated at the trial itself' 3 In contrast, secret evidence has been allowed in
other contexts, including some that lead to long-term detention, most impor-
tantly (in the United Kingdom) in proceedings to determine whether a suspected
terrorist may be detained on preventive grounds and (in both the United Kingdom
and Canada) in proceedings to determine whether a foreign national may be
detained because he or she is believed to pose a security threat.
Thus, in the United Kingdom, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 200514 provides for
the issuance of control orders to detain terrorist suspects; in Canada, pursuant to
15
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001, security certificates have been
issued for the detention of foreign nationals. The origins of these regimes differ in
that the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 draws on the history of detention
powers exercised during the conflict in Northern Ireland 6 whereas the security
certificate regime in Canada remains rooted in the immigration law of detention
and deportation. By extension, the Canadian regime applies only to non-citizens
while the UK system of control orders extends, since 2005, beyond the
immigration context to apply to nationals and non-nationals alike. That said, both
regimes are comparable for present purposes because they allow secret evidence
11 M. L. Satterthwaite, 'Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law' (2006) 75
George Wash L Rev 1333.
12 For example, A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68 at [100] (Lord
Hope) and [155] (Lord Scott); Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorismn Policy and Human
Rights: Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention, HL Paper 240, HC 1576 2005-06, paras 74-75.
13 See the discussion at Part 2(a) below.
14 Sections 1 and 2.
15 Section 77(1).
16 C. Gearty, Civil Liberties (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007) 114-17; G. Marcus, 'Secret
Witnesses' [1990] Public Law 207 at 210-12.
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in order to justify the detention of an individual or the imposition of onerous
restrictions on his or her place of residence, movements, contacts, and communi-
cations. While the degree of encroachment on liberty may vary according to
whether the person who is incarcerated is given the option to leave the country,
for example, it is clear that incarceration in any case has serious consequences for
the individual. Both the United Kingdom and Canadian regimes may therefore be
viewed as quasi-criminal given the extent to which they restrict liberty." As the
Supreme Court of Canada recently stated: 8
The consequences of security certificates are often more severe than
those of many criminal charges. For instance, the possible repercus-
sions of the process range from detention for an indeterminate period
to removal from Canada, and sometimes to a risk of persecution,
infringement of the right to integrity of the person, or even death.
The use of secret evidence to detain individuals has, unsurprisingly, generated
controversy in both the United Kingdom and Canada." But this is not the only
context in which secrecy powers have expanded. In Canada, for example, amend-
ments in 2001 to the Criminal Code of Canada 198520 allowed the executive, with
court approval, to require a witness at a criminal trial to testify under oath at a
closed investigative hearing in the absence of the accused. Also in 2001, amend-
ments to s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act 1985 gave the Attorney-General of
Canada wide-ranging powers to block release in any proceeding of'sensitive infor-
mation', the disclosure of which the Attorney-General believes would harm
national security, national defence, or international relations, even after a court
concludes that disclosure would not cause such harm or that the information
should nevertheless be disclosed in the public interest. Thus, there are numerous
contexts in which the executive's powers to keep evidence secret, although known
before 2001, appear to have expanded.
Different procedural contexts in which secrecy powers are exercised, and secret
evidence admitted, will involve different sorts of consequences for the individual
17 Secretary of State for the Hone DeparumentvJJ [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 AC 385.
18 Chark aoui v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Solicitor General of Canada) 2008 SCC 38
(26 June 2008) (hereafter Charkaoui No. 2) at [54].
19 International Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Concluding
Observaftions on the flUnited Kmgdotm (10 December 2003, CERD]C/63/CO111) para. 17; Joint Committee
on Human Rights, above n. 12 at paras 42-43.
20 Section 83.28(4).
21 C. Forcese, 'Clouding Accountability: Canada's Government Secrecy and National Security Law
"Complex" ' (2004) 36 Ottawa L Rev 49 at 69-83.
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who is affected by adjudicative decision-making. Criminal proceedings obviously
carry the prospect of criminal sanctions. However, administrative proceedings
may also entail serious consequences for the liberty and mobility of the
individual, potentially culminating in long-term detention or deportation,
alongside lesser encroachments such as the removal of one's passport." Moreover,
legal proceedings may have significant consequences for the individual without
encroaching on his or her liberty or mobility. These include, for example, orders
to pay a fine or damages, the seizure of property, the denial of security clearance,
the acquisition and storage of personal information, adverse findings of
misconduct by a commission of inquiry, or a refusal of access to government infor-
mation. 4
It is important to bear in mind the variety of procedural contexts in which the
legitimacy of secret evidence may fall for consideration. Although secret evidence
is entirely inappropriate in some contexts, in others it may be unavoidable or
desirable as a means to facilitate independent review of the workings of hidden
government. The circumstances for and implications of secret evidence also vary
depending on the factual and legal issues at stake. Procedural adaptations of
adjudication designed to accommodate secret evidence may be correspondingly
flexible. The question is not simply whether it is appropriate to allow secret
evidence, however vital that question may be. In some circumstances, it is also
important to consider how to adapt the process on an informed and self-conscious
basis where the use of secret evidence is not deemed to be irreparably unsafe or
unfair.
(b) Judicial review
Since 2001, the legal terrain for secret evidence has been characterised by greater
reliance on the courts to approve decision-making processes that involve closed
proceedings and, in turn, to review and legitimate executive claims in such
proceedings. In the United Kingdom and Canada, the use of secret evidence
remains subject to review by courts or by specialised tribunals whose decisions
may in turn be challenged in the courts. The role of the courts in this regard is
constantly evolving as the different branches of the state confront and contest the
use of closed proceedings in different contexts.
22 Leigh, above n. 8 at 150.
23 E. Broxmeyer, 'The Problems of Security and Freedom: Procedural Due Process and the Designation
of Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act'
(2004) 22 Berkeley J Int'l L 439 at 483.
24 P. Hanks, 'National Security-A Political Concept' (1988) 14 Monash U L Rev 114 at 132.
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Thus, in the United Kingdom, the issuance of control orders under the Prevention
of Terrorism Act 2005 is subject to judicial approval 5 or review26 in closed
proceedings governed by Part 76 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The courts thus play
the central role in the decision-making process. On the other hand, under the
earlier regime of Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, a
certificate could be issued for the detention of a non-citizen' 7 and the individual
could in turn appeal against the certificate to a tribunal of the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission (SJAC), 8 consisting of a High Court judge as
chair, a second member drawn from a panel of judges with experience in
immigration appeals, and a third member who was a lay person with experience
in assessing security intelligence.29 The SJAC tribunal would resolve the appeal
after considering secret evidence and its decisions were subject to further appeal
to the ordinary administrative law courts. This arrangement for issuing and
reviewing certificates against non-citizens was the subject of the House of Lords
decision in the Belmarsh case,3" which found that the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001 regime violated the right to liberty and security of the person
under the European Convention on Human Rights on the basis that it was a dispro-
portionate response to the threat of terrorism and that its application to foreign
nationals only, and not citizens, was unjustifiably discriminatory." In response,
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was enacted. It allows for the use of secret
evidence to detain citizens and foreign nationals alike, and it replaced the process
of SIAC review with one of judicial scrutiny. Control orders are now subject to
judicial approval or review in closed hearings at which relevant material can be
withheld from the individual.
In Canada, much of the responsibility for adjudicative review in security
proceedings, outside of the criminal context, is assigned to the Federal Court, at
25 Section 4.
26 Section 3.
27 H. Fenwick, 'The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11
September?' (2002) 65 MLR 724 at 733; D. Bonner, Executive Measures, Terrorism and National Security
(Ashgate: Aldershot, 2007) 209.
28 SLAC was established in 1997 in response to the European Court of Human Rights' decision in
Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413 at [131] and [144]. D. Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006) 163.
29 Bonner, above n. 27 at 265-6; B. Barder, 'Brian Barder explains why he resigned from the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission', London Review4 of Books (18 March 2004) 40.
30 A v Secretar, of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68 at [100] (Lord Hope) and
[155] (Lord Scott).
31 The Supreme Court of Canada has upheld the Canadian regime on the basis that the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (s. 6) specifically provides for differential treatment of citizens and
non-citizens in deportation matters: Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2007] 1 SCR
350 (hereafter Charkaoui No. 1) at [129].
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which a number of judges have been designated to hear cases in which confi-
dential information is advanced. This includes, in particular, the review of
executive claims in relation to security certificates issued under ss. 77(2) and 78 of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001, applications for security
warrants under s. 21(l) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1985,
applications to suppress the disclosure of sensitive information under s. 38.04 of
the Canada Evidence Act 1985, and decisions to list an organisation as a terrorist
entity under subss. 83.05(1) and (5) of the Criminal Code of Canada. Typically, after
examining confidential information at a closed hearing, the Federal Court judge
decides whether the information can be disclosed to the individual by way of
partial disclosure or a summary. Notably, although Canadian law after 2002
moved away from the use of a separate counsel to represent the individual's
perspective in closed proceedings, 32 this changed as a result of the Supreme Court
of Canada's decision in Charkaoui No. 1.33 In that decision, the Supreme Court
found that the security certificates regime was inconsistent with the principles of
fundamental justice that protect the right to life, liberty, and security of the
person under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in part because the
regime did not provide for the appointment of 'an independent agent at the stage
of judicial review to better protect the named person's interests'2.3' The Supreme
Court also cited, among other possibilities, the UK system for the appointment of a
special advocate, drawn from a panel of senior barristers specialising in
immigration and human rights law, whose role is to represent the interests of the
affected individual in closed hearings and who is given access to the confidential
information put forward by the executive.
In both countries, therefore, judges are tasked with the review of secret evidence,
alongside any open evidence, before deciding whether to uphold a claim to
non-disclosure on national security grounds by the executive. The individual is
not denied any and all opportunity to reply to the executive's claims. Rather, the
32 The review of confidentiality claims in Canadian immigration proceedings was originally carried
out by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) as part of SIRC's investigation and review
of government determinations that an individual was inadmissible to Canada based on an alleged
threat to security. SIRC's review role was bypassed by legislative reforms in 1988 in the case of
security certificates against foreign nationals, and in 2002 in the case of certificates against
permanent residents, in favour of review by the Federal Court of Canada (now simply the Federal
Court). The SIRC process, unlike the Federal Court, had provided for the appointment of a special
counsel to act on behalf of the individual's interests in closed proceedings and to negotiate with
CSIS about the disclosure of a summary of secret evidence, under the supervision of the presiding
member of SIRC.
33 Above n. 31.
34 Ibid. at [3].
35 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, s. 6(1); SLNC Rules, r. 35.
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individual is denied access to what maybe central aspects of the state's case and is
therefore unable to fashion a reply and exercise procedural rights in an informed
way.
2. The weaknesses of adjudicative review in closed proceedings
The conflict of interest that is inherent in hidden government presents a major
concern for adjudication because of the ways in which secrecy tends to undermine
truth-seeking. Three weaknesses in particular confront courts when faced with
secret evidence. The first weakness arises from the denial of access to the evidence
by the affected individual and by the public. The second arises from the courts'
dependence on executive agencies, including foreign governments, to supply and
characterise the confidential information from which secret evidence is drawn.
The third arises from the adjudicative dynamic that secrecy generates in the
security context, which may condition a judge over time to favour secrecy over
disclosure. Each of these limitations is now examined.
(a) The absence of the individual and the public
The first set of limitations in closed proceedings arises from the inability of the
individual to present a reply to claims against him or her by probing or elabo-
rating upon the record and by presenting an informed counter-argument. The
court is deprived of the fruits of a counter-investigation by the affected individual
in response to the executive's case.6 The court will not hear exculpatory evidence
that the individual alone may be in a position to supply or uncover." State
witnesses will not be subjected to cross-examination in contradiction of the
venerated principle that evidence must be open to denunciation by the opposing
party. Further, the court is denied the benefit of hearing a properly informed
argument from the individual. Thus, core safeguards of the adversarial process are
lost."
In the absence of the individual party, the judge in a closed proceeding may be
compelled to challenge more directly the executive's case on behalf of the
individual." He or she may attempt to represent the individual's interest in
36 J. K. Hugessen, 'Watching the Watchers: Democratic Oversight', Paper presented to the Canadian
Institute for the Administration ofjustice's conference on 'Terrorism, Law and Democracy: How is
Canada changing following September 11?' (Montreal, 25-26 March 2002) 384-5; Council of
Europe (Commissioner for Human Rights), Report b, Mr Alvaro-Gil Robles, Commissioner for Human
Rights, on his Visit to the United Kingdom 4th-12th November 2004, CommDH (2005) 6 at para. 21.
37 Leigh, above n. 8 at 118.
38 YaroshefsIV, above n. 7 at 1066 and 1071.
39 P. Duff, 'Disclosure of Evidence and Public Interest Immunity' (2007) 10 Scots Law Times 63 at 66;
Leigh, above n. 8 at 137.
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reviewing the written record, questioning state witnesses, and searching for
further evidence that might benefit the individual. This judicial straddling of the
line, although necessary, is not a satisfactory arrangement. The judge is less able
to represent the individual than would be the individual's own lawyer, first
because the judge has no access to information the individual would otherwise
share with counsel in privileged discussions about how to prepare for and present
the case." The judge may not hear whether the accused has an alibi at a key
moment or whether there is some innocent explanation for allegedly suspicious
activity. In the words of the Supreme Court of Canada inCharkaoui No. 1, 'the judge,
sitting alone in closed proceedings, simply cannot fill the vacuum left by the
removal of the traditional guarantees of a fair hearing'. The judge 'is not in a
position to compensate for the lack of informed scrutiny, challenge and
counter-evidence that a person familiar with the case could bring'." In addition,
unlike the individual's lawyer, the judge must exercise restraint when probing the
executive's evidence and argument in order to protect the court's neutrality.4 2 A
judge can question state witnesses aggressively, for example, only at the risk of
undermining his or her credibility as the ultimate decision-maker. Because he or
she is 'the only person in the justice system whose sole obligation and loyalty is to
the defendant',4" an individual's own lawyer is uniquely positioned to advocate for
the individual.4
A comparison to the criminal context
It might be argued that ex parte proceedings and secrecy are not unknown in the
criminal context and, as such, that restrictions on confidentiality in non-criminal
proceedings-where the consequences for the individual are less serious-should
not be discounted. In particular, doctrines of privilege or public interest
immunity in criminal proceedings may permit the Crown to seek judicial
approval to withhold relevant information from the accused in order, for
example, to enable a vulnerable witness to testify, to protect the identity of a confi-
dential informer, or to protect national security. But however significantly these
doctrines may affect the determination of guilt or innocence in a criminal
proceeding, the cloak of secrecy that they extend is more limited than in other
security-related proceedings. First, it does not extend to the actual evidence
40 Hugessen, above n. 36 at 384.
41 Charkaoui No. 1, above n. 31 at [63] and [64].
42 J. Jackson and S. DoranJudge WithoutJuiy (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995) 134-5.
43 Dratel, above n. 10 at 81 (original emphasis).
44 In recognition of these limitations to adjudicative review arising from the absence of the
individual, the regimes for secret evidence in both the United Kingdom and Canada provide for the
appointment of a surrogate counsel, known as a special advocate, to represent the individual in
closed proceedings. This procedural adaptation to the use of secret evidence is discussed briefly in
the conclusion of this article.
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adduced at trial in support of the Crown's case or to the allegations directed
against the individual. Secondly, it is subject to tight controls requiring the
withdrawal of the charge by the Crown or dismissal of the case by the court, where
the evidence goes to a central issue in the trial.
Consider the Canadian approach to informer privilege in criminal proceedings. In
such proceedings, the identity of an informer may be withheld from the accused
where the information supplied by the informer was given to police on the express
or implied condition that the informer's identity be shielded by the executive."
This is so despite the fact that disclosure of the contents of such evidence or
aspects of its origins (such as financial or other incentives given to the informer by
the executive) would better enable the individual to understand and respond to
the executive's claims.46 Informers may have reason to fabricate or embellish
information they provide, for example in order to avoid prosecution or depor-
tation,' 7 and, without knowing the identity of an informer, an individual cannot
identify reasons-of which he or she may be uniquely aware-that cast doubt on
the informer. Yet confidentiality is accepted, within limits,48 in order to protect
the state's capacity to investigate and apprehend criminal activity. Similarly, in
non-criminal security proceedings, a primary rationale for secrecy is the need to
protect the state's ability to establish relationships with informers who have
knowledge of potential security threats by making credible commitments to
protect their identity.
On the other hand, informer privilege is restricted to information that arises in
the course of the investigation of an offence, and does not extend to information
introduced as actual evidence at trial. The purpose of information derived from a
confidential informer is typically to allow the police to show reasonable and
probable grounds to obtain a search warrant. The confidentiality of tips thus
serves as a means to obtain other, disclosable evidence for use at trial. While the
identity of the tipster whose information provided the basis for a warrant may be
45 R v Leipert [1997] 1 SCR 281 at [9]-[12].
46 To illustrate, the content of a tip by an informer that a person attended a meeting of an organi-
sation on a specific date would typically require protection in order not to reveal the source,
whereas the content of a tip that the person is believed to be a member of the organisation might
be disclosed without this danger.
47 S. Greer, Supergrasses (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995) 275-6; D. V. Ward, 'Confidential Informants
in National Security Investigations' (2006) 47 Boston College L Rev 627 at 636-7 and 652-6; R. M.
Bloom, Ratting: 'the Use and Abuse of Informants in the American Justice System (Praeger: Westport, CT,
2002).
48 See RvDa ;is [2008] UKHL 36, [2008] 2 CrApp R 33 where the House of Lords unanimously quashed
the conviction and ordered a new trial on the basis that allowances for witness anonymity had
rendered the first trial unfair.
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kept confidential, evidence derived from the search will be disclosed to the
accused. Moreover, even at the investigative stage, the courts emphasise the need
for careful scrutiny of information supplied by confidential informers where the
information supports a search warrant application.4" The Supreme Court of
Canada has indicated that a 'bald conclusory' tip by an informer is insufficient to
demonstrate reasonable and probable grounds for a warrant and has emphasised
that information from a confidential informer must be compelling, credible, and
corroborated by a police investigation before the courts will authorise a search.
Also, where the credibility of the informer cannot be assessed because the
informer is anonymous or untried, this must be compensated by the quality of the
information and corroborative evidence." Confidential information relating to
informer privilege is thus approached with caution at the investigative stage and
subject to disclosure if relied on at trial.
In contrast, in other security-related proceedings-including UK control order and
Canadian security certificate proceedings-there is broad scope for the use of
testimony (including hearsay) derived from confidential informers as part of the
evidentiary foundation for the state's case. In the security field, human intelli-
gence sources commonly do not take the stand even in a closed proceeding and so
they are never questioned directly and under oath about their version of events.
Instead, a security official testifies as to the source's story or, in some cases,
presents information drawn from a report from the field officer who had contact
with the informer, but who also may never testify under oath. In such circum-
stances, the risk of error or abuse is magnified greatly from that in a criminal trial
where the evidence adduced will be disclosed, although it was derived from a
search that was triggered originally by a confidential tip. Both criminal and
non-criminal proceedings share a common security-based rationale for
attempting to balance the competing interests in confidentiality and disclosure,
but they achieve that compromise in very different ways.5
A second example can be found in the approach to claims of public interest
immunity in criminal proceedings in England and Wales as examined in decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).5' The immunity is typically
49 R v Debot [1989] 2 SCR 1140 at 1168-9. See also Nova Scotia (AG) v Macintyre [1982] 1 SCR 175.
On informer's privilege and search warrant applications, see S. Penney, E. Rondinelli and
J. Stribopoulos, Crimninal Procedure in Canada (LexisNexis: forthcoming, 2009) ch. 3. On confiden-
tiality and wiretapping warrants, see Leigh, above n. 8 at 126-7.
50 RvDebot [1989] 2 SCR 1140 at 1170-1, above n. 49.
51 On US approaches to confidential informers in criminal and national security proceedings, see
Ward, above n. 47.
52 Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 1;Jasper v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 97; Fit v
United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 223.
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asserted as a basis for restricting the duty of the Crown to disclose relevant infor-
mation to the accused.53 But again this involves a decision by the Crown to
withhold information that it would otherwise disclose; it does not extend to the
actual use of secret evidence at trial. Moreover, the ECtHR and English domestic
courts have placed a series of restrictions on the assertion of the privilege in order
to ensure the right to a fair and public hearing in criminal cases. In particular,
the ECtHR concluded in Rowe and Davis that the restriction on the rights of the
defence must be 'strictly necessary' and that any difficulties caused to the defence
must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the adoption of adequate procedural
safeguards." Also, the ECtHR found non-compliant a procedure in which 'the
prosecution itself attempts to assess the importance of concealed information to
the defence and weigh this against the public interest in keeping the information
secret'. Importantly, it was up to the judge at trial to determine issues of relevance
and disclosure because it was the trial judge 'who saw the witnesses give their
testimony and was fully versed in all the evidence and issues in the case' and
because he or she 'would have been in a position to monitor the need for
disclosure throughout the trial, assessing the importance of the undisclosed
evidence at a stage when new issues were emerging'. 55 Again, these limitations on
secret evidence in criminal proceedings are not present in non-criminal
security-related proceedings where the state may withhold its evidence and
detailed allegations from the individual, where the duty of disclosure is less
categorical, and where (as under the Canada Evidence Act) issues of relevance and
disclosure are determined by a judge other than the judge in the underlying
substantive proceeding.
The absence of the public
Alongside limitations arising from the absence of the individual is the obvious
corollary that the public also has no access to closed proceedings. The absence of the
public is a significant limitation." It raises accountability concerns in general and
more specifically in security-related proceedings where secrecy is necessarily
pervasive and typically permanent. First, keeping evidence secret means that
witnesses will not testify, and government counsel will not present argument,
under public scrutiny and third parties who may have relevant information-but
who will be able to come forward only if made aware of the evidence-cannot do
so." This poses a risk beyond that present in open proceedings that the adjudicative
53 R. Munday, Evidence, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005) 151-2; R. Scott, 'The Acceptable
and Unacceptable Uses of Public Interest Immunity' [1996] Public Law 427 at 427-8.
54 Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 1 at [61], above n. 52.
55 Ibid. at [65]
56 Marcus, above n. 16 at 207-8.
57 Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp. [1994] 3 SCR 835 at 882-3.
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decision will be founded on incomplete or inaccurate information. Revealing the
evidence to a representative of the individual (or to the individual himself or
herself) on condition of confidentiality does not address this concern because it
precludes third parties from being informed in follow-up investigations.
Secondly, the absence of the public hampers the judge's ability to look behind the
state's case against the individual and its reasons for secrecy. The need for
systematic secrecy means that courts are less able to hear from independent
experts, for the simple reason that few outside government are able to develop
sophisticated and well-informed expertise in the field. There are experts, often
retired security officials, who can offer expertise that is informed by extensive
experience in the work and techniques of security intelligence. But this expertise
remains concentrated in a small group of persons who have past connections to
government. Even where an expert independent of the security agencies is called
to testify on the evidence and the rationales for secrecy in a particular case, the
expert will be shut out from the closed loop of up-to-date information, examined
with reference to other live intelligence files, that is available to the insider. The
executive becomes by default the judge's guide to the murky world of security
intelligence," tasked with outlining the state's current priorities in relation to the
case against the individual, its information-sharing practices, the motivations of
foreign governments, the strengths and weaknesses of its investigative
techniques, and so on. This of course does not mean that sensitive information
should be released in order to support the development of a wider base of
expertise on security intelligence. But it does indicate that secrecy in the security
context has wider implications for adjudicative decision-making over and above
its impact on the instant case.
(b) Dependence on the executive
A second set of limitations arises from the courts' dependence on the executive,
above all its security arm, to be fair and forthcoming in supplying confidential
information, in depicting how the information was acquired and selected for
presentation to the court, and in producing all information in the state's custody
that maybe beneficial to the individual. In a closed proceeding, the judge is not in
a position to review the underlying record of information held by the executive. As
a result, greater opportunities arise for error or abuse than in cases where a more
extensive duty of disclosure applies or where alternative, independent means of
investigation are available."
58 G. E. Rosen, 'Remarks of Judge Gerald E. Rosen-the War on Terrorism in the Courts' (2004) 21 TVI
Cooley L Rev 159 at 164.
59 E. Margulies, 'Above Contempt?: Regulating Government Overreaching in Terrorism Cases' (2005)
Southwestern U L Rev 449 at 475.
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Security agencies assess the reliability of information in order to make decisions
about threats to security and about possible responses. Their mandate is not to
assess evidence against legal standards. In Manget's words: 'Intelligence looks
forward and provides an estimate of what is happening and what will happen.
Eveiyone is guilty until proven innocent, and innocence does not last'.6" When
confronted with secret evidence, therefore, a court depends on the executive not
only to be fair and forthcoming in its presentation of the state's case, but also to
adapt its ingrained methods of analysis and assessment to an adjudicative
environment. This opens the door not simply to intentional abuse but also to
unintended error or misrepresentation in the presentation of security intelli-
gence as evidence.
These concerns are accentuated by documented instances in which the courts'
trust of the executive on matters of secrecy has been betrayed." A number of
instances of the manipulation of secrecy by government officials in order to avoid
embarrassment to themselves or the government came to light as a result of the
Arar Inquiry in Canada.62 For example, it was revealed that the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) had previously misled a Canadian court on the likelihood
that secret evidence obtained from Syrian Military Intelligence, and used to
support an application by police for a warrant, was the product of torture . This
fact was disclosed publicly only after the Inquiry released its reports and sought a
court order to authorise disclosure over the objections of the government. The
60 F. F. Manget, 'Intelligence and the Criminal Law System' (2006) 17 Stan L & Policy Rev 415 at 416. See
also C. Walker, 'Intelligence and Anti-terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom' (2005) 44 Cinie,
Law and Social Change 387 at 388.
61 Bhupinder S. Liddar v Deputy Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, File No. 1170/LIDD/04 (7 June 2005) at para. 72; Atwal v Canada
(Solicitor General) [1988] 1 FC 107 (TD). Dratel, above n. 10 at 100; M. Scaperlanda, 'Are We That Far
Gone'?: Due Process and Secret Deportation Proceedings' (1996) Stan L & Policy Rev 23 at 28; D. Cole,
'Enemy Aliens' (2002) 54 Stan L Rev 953 at 1001-2; S. M. Akram and K. R. Johnson, 'Race, Civil Rights,
and Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting ofArabs and Muslims' (2002) 58 NYU
Ann Surv Am L 295 at 324-5; N. T. Saito, 'The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The
"Plenary Power" Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights' (2003) 10 Asian 1J 13 at 19-20;
Note, 'Secret Evidence in the War on Terror' (2005) 118 Hap, L Rev 1962 at 1979-80; J. Lu, 'How
Terror Changed Justice: A Call to Reform Safeguards that Protect Against Prosecutorial
Misconduct' (2006) 14J L & Policy 377 at 379-80.
62 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials Relating to Maher Arar (Canada),
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar-Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa, 2006) (hereafter Arar
Report-Analysis and Recommendations) 255-63. The Inquiry's mandate was to examine the role
played by Canadian officials in the detention and removal of the Canadian citizen Maher Aar by
US authorities, and his subsequent imprisonment and torture in Syria.
63 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials Relating to Maher Aar (Canada),
Report ofthe Events Relating to Maher Arar-Addendum -Disclosure of information authorized by the Federal
Court of Canada in accordance with Sections 38.04 and 38.06 of the Canada Evidence Act (Ottawa, 2007)
127-8.
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government resisted disclosure, purportedly on security grounds, for more than
two years after the establishment of the Inquiry. The lesson is that, where the
executive misleads a court about secret evidence, the truth is unlikely to emerge
without sustained pressure by an independent entity with detailed knowledge of
the underlying record of the case. Without thorough, independent review of the
executive's claims it will be impossible for ajudge, let alone those denied access to
closed proceedings, to know whether secrecy powers have been misused."
Information supplied by a foreign source
Judicial dependence on the executive is especially problematic where secret
evidence originates in a foreign government. This is not uncommon. A key
rationale for national security confidentiality is the need for the state to honour
its commitments (or 'caveats') to foreign entities. This rationale is especially
compelling in the security context because a state is often able to acquire infor-
mation from other states only by agreeing not to pass it on to third parties. A state
must therefore be able to make credible promises of confidentiality in order to
protect its ability to engage in information-sharing." Yet, for a court, foreign-
sourced information presents special quandaries because it calls for scrutiny of at
least three actors: the original source, the authorities of the providing state, and
the authorities of the receiving state. Each actor may have reasons to filter or
fabricate information.
The court's task thus extends to the assessment of foreign entities and sources and
of the likelihood that they may have erred in presenting information, withheld
relevant material, relied on inappropriate interrogation methods, or deceived
the receiving state for their own purposes. In conducting this assessment, neither
the court nor its security agencies may be able to know with confidence how the
foreign government acquired or produced the information or whether it was
filtered through third states. For example, who in the receiving state will be able
to say whether a confession by a prisoner in another state has been coerced or
fabricated? An obvious danger is that the foreign government has actively misled
the receiving state; we are speaking of the world of espionage as well as intelli-
gence after all. The court may not know whether and how the information wound
its way through the security apparatus of other states6 and may not be privy to the
64 The US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court recently condemned the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation for giving false or misleading evidence in 75 security warrant cases under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act: Re Sealed Case, 218 F Supp 2d, 620, rev'd 310 F 3d, at 735.
65 For example, Ruby v Canada (Solicitor General) [2002] 4 SCR 3 at [44].
66 M. M. O'Neil, 'Crawford v Washington: Implications for the War on Terrorism' (2005) 54 Catholic U L
Rev 1077 at 1091.
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foreign policy motivations and machinations of the foreign government." The
court cannot call foreign officials to testify and is unlikely to hear testimony from,
or even to know the identity of, informers abroad. The court is thus seriously
hampered in its ability to probe the executive's case.
The court in the receiving state relies in closed hearings on its own government
and, especially, on the agencies that deal regularly in the information exchange in
security matters. But those agencies have wider relationships with other govern-
ments that they must cultivate as part of their mandate to collect useful
information. An agency's responsibility to serve the court may be important, but it
remains one consideration alongside others in the agency's pursuit of its mission
to identify and protect against threats. In the course of this mission, individuals
may become useful bargaining chips in international dealings with other
entities. 8 Alternatively, a security agency may be reluctant to question before a
court the reliability or motivations of a foreign government with which it has an
ongoing relationship, especially after the agency has chosen to put before the
court information from that government. In these respects, a judge may not be
fully informed of the exigencies of its security agencies' dealings with a foreign
government that has supplied secret evidence.
Another danger is that officials from different states could seek to manipulate
information exchange in order to construct rationales for secrecy in each other's
jurisdictions. Because it is the executive that initiates proceedings against the
individual, while also deciding how its information-sharing arrangements are
constructed and negotiated, the court should not extend blanket protections from
disclosure to foreign-sourced information nor should it lower evidentiary
standards that otherwise apply to the types of evidence proffered. Doing so opens
the door to the artificial use of foreign caveats as a vehicle to inoculate infor-
mation against disclosure and against the rigours of the ordinary legal process.
Likewise, where the executive proposes to use foreign-sourced information as
67 The foreign agency may wish to discredit political opponents abroad by spreading false
information about them: W. Schabas, 'Fair Trials and National Security Evidence' (2006) 4 Int'l
Commentary on Evidence, 'Xuticle 9 at 4; J. Ramji-Nogales, 'A Global Approach to Secret Evidence:
How Human Rights Law Can Reform Our Immigration System' (2008) Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 2008-38 <http:/papers.ssrn.com/sol3!papers.cfm?abstract-id=1080317>, accessed
16 October 2008, at 18, citing Re Ahmned, No. A90-674-238 (NY, Immig Ct, 30 July 1999) at 14-15.
68 A. B. Spiegel, 'Human Rights Versus National Security' (1981) 4 Houston J Int'l L 148 at 153, citing
Stein v Deparnment of Justice (No. 77 C 954), details of which were leaked to the Chicago Sun Tirnes
(9 April 1980) at 3 and (15 October 1979) at I (involving a Chicago attorney who handled numerous
political asylum cases on behalf of Polish immigrants, and who discovered through a Freedom of
Information request that the FBI had compiled a dossier on him and was turning over personal and
confidential information they had gathered to the Polish secret police).
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secret evidence, the court should hold the executive to a reasonable duty to
negotiate with the providing state in order to maximise disclosure.69 The execu-
tive's decision to agree to a caveat when receiving foreign information could also
be taken as an election to limit the extent to which such information can be intro-
duced in an adjudicative process against an individual. The integrity of
adjudication requires that information-sharing be adapted to the demands of
accuracy and fairness, not the other way around.
The decision in Charkaoui No. 2
The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged limitations arising from judicial
dependence on the executive and took steps to address them in Charkaoui No. 2."
The case involved the use of secret evidence that originated in operational activ-
ities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Mr Charkaoui, a
permanent resident of Canada, had been detained for 21 months pursuant to a
security certificate. Prior to a fourth judicial review of his detention, the
government revealed that a document that should have been disclosed to the
court when the security certificate was issued had not been disclosed due to an
oversight. The document was a CSIS report summarising two CSIS interviews with
Mr Charkaoui that took place prior to his detention. In reply to Mr Charkaoui's
request for disclosure of the notes and recordings of the interviews, the
government stated that there were no recordings on file and that notes of CSIS
interviews are, based on CSIS policy, systematically destroyed after the CSIS officer
completes his or her report. Thus, the judge reviewing Mr Charkaoui's detention
would have to rely on interview summaries prepared by executive officials.
In these circumstances, the Supreme Court found that CSIS breached its duties
under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and under s. 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to retain all of the information in its
possession relating to security certificate investigations and to disclose that infor-
mation to relevant ministers and the reviewing judge. LeBel and FishJJ stated for a
unanimous court that submission of the operational notes of CSIS officers to the
court 'may be necessary to ensure that a complete and objective version of the
facts is available to those responsible for issuing and reviewing the certificate'.'
They concluded also that '[i]f the original evidence was destroyed, the designated
judge has access only to summaries prepared by the state, which means that it will
be difficult, if not impossible, to verify the allegations' against the individual. It
followed that 'the destruction by CSIS officers of their operational notes
69 Abdullah l(hadrvAttorney General of Canada, 2008 FC 549 (29 April 2008) at [93]-[95].
70 Chai kaoui v Canada (Minister of Ctizenship and Immigration and Solicitor General of Canada) 2008 SCC 38
(hereafter Charkaoui No. 2).
71 Charkaoui Nbo. 2, above n. 70 at [42].
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compromises the very function of judicial review'.12 These concerns reflect the
wider limitations arising from judicial dependence on the executive in closed
proceedings, which are further explored in the next section of this article.
(c) The dynamic of closed proceedings
Closed proceedings in the security context have a dynamic that is unlike other
confidential adjudication owing to a combination of factors that may encourage
the courts, sometimes in subtle ways, to favour unduly the executive's position
over that of the individual. This tendency is in part the outcome of the two factors
previously discussed-the absence of the individual and the public, and the courts'
dependence on the executive-both of which contribute to an adjudicative
environment in which the security interest obtains a privileged status as a result
of its more direct and responsive representation before the court. Besides this, a
judge may lean toward the executive's position for more diffuse reasons arising
from the dynamic of closed proceedings and from the type of issues that arise in
confidentiality review."
The atmosphere of closed hearings
In the first place, closed hearings have a unique tone and atmosphere that reflects
the priorities and culture of the security realm. This realm is populated by officials
whose raison d'Otre is to identify and counter security threats and whose training
and professional experience understandably press them to emphasise secrecy over
disclosure, and expediency over concerns to protect the administration of justice.
Other than the judge and a handful of court staff, closed hearings will be attended
by government counsel, government witnesses, and government observers who
are all drawn from or connected to the security realm. Other than the judge, the
only experts (legal and non-legal) in the room in which the hearing takes place will
be those of the state, and they will have exclusive access to and control over the
background information and underlying record for the case. Thus, they will have
incomparably specialised expertise in the most arcane of fields. In these respects,
the executive's presence looms large, both physically and psychologically, as a
constant reminder of the security interest.
This environment need not influence the judge in an overt or conscious way, but it
may contribute over time to a dynamic in which security and secrecy crowd out
other priorities." One need not suspect that security officials have actively misled
72 Cuirkaoui No. 2, above n. 70 at [61]-[62].
73 Margulies, above n. 59 at 459.
74 Margulies, above n. 59 at 465.
75 Leigh, above n. 8 at 159.
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a judge in a particular case in order to accept that judicial review of the executive
in these matters is shaped by how security officials present their activities and vet
the information they collect before putting it before the court, and by their own
vulnerability to errors that an open process would otherwise deter or uncover.7
Even where a judge is not swayed by 'nightmarish tales of national security
problems'," he or she must confront serious obstacles to peeling away any layers
of obfuscation or to uncovering any subtle bending of the truth on the part of
security officials.
Lack of judicial expertise
A key reason for the courts' hesitancy to question the executive, especially in its
characterisation of the implications of disclosure of confidential information, is
the reviewing court's acknowledged lack of pertinent expertise. It is a very
complex task to evaluate confidential information or intelligence, predict how its
release may harm the security interest, weigh this risk against the need for
openness and fairness, devise ways to maximise disclosure without allowing the
intricacies of document review to overwhelm the adjudicative process, and
regulate compliance by the executive with court orders to release information.
Each of these elements of the process may in turn engage wide-ranging issues
such as the novelty of investigative techniques, the effectiveness of data-mining
software, the conditions of a witness's imprisonment in a foreign country, the
motivations of a foreign agency to share information, the immutability of govern-
mental caveats, and so on.
In examining these issues, a court must be sensitive to challenges faced by the
security agencies." It is a difficult undertaking to identify and evaluate
clandestine threats and viable responses under conditions of systematic secrecy.
This task calls for laborious collection, classification, analysis, distribution, and
prioritisation of vast data sets collected from disparate sources of varying
reliability. It involves targets of investigation whose networks are evolving, who
conceal their aims and connections, and who may be prepared to exploit the
freedoms of a democratic society. It would be difficult if not simply unrealistic for
a judge to become well versed in the full panoply of threats associated with diverse
76 Margulies, above n. 59 at 476; Rosen, above n. 58 at 168; Note, 'The National Security Interest and
Civil Liberties' (1972) 85 Hawv L Rev 1130 at 1134.
77 R. P. Salgado, Government Secrets, Fair Trials, and the Classified Information Procedures Act'
(1988) 98 Yale LJ 427 at 429 and 438.
78 Note, 'Executive Privilege and the Freedom of Information Act: The Constitutional Foundation of
the Amended National Security Exemption' (1976) Washington Univ LQ609 at 660-2.
79 B. J. Narain, 'Confidentiality, National Security, and the Right to Know-The Spycatcher Decision'
(1988) 39 N Ireland Leg Quarterly 73 at 73-4.
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organisations, governments, and regions of the world. Indeed, it may in some
cases appear futile for the court to attempt to determine all of the implications of
a decision to release confidential information to the public or to the individual, in
the course of the court's balancing of competing rationales for disclosure and
secrecy.8" The recognition by judges of their relative lack of expertise in these
respects explains much of the courts' tendency to accept executive overtures for
deference in the security field.8
By the same token, courts 'ought not to panic at the mere mention of national
security and abdicate their inherent power in common law', as Narain puts it.82
The courts have their own realm of expertise and a profound responsibility to
ensure that the protection of security does not sacrifice core principles of the
administration of justice." Security agencies likewise do not have expertise in
managing the risks of secrecy in legal decision-making, and their views on
whether and how closed proceedings should be permitted may be influenced by
their mandate to counter security threats. There is also a record of over-claiming
confidentiality (as well as selective leaking) in security matters, including in
adjudicative proceedings.84 It is therefore important for the courts to adopt
openness as an initial presumption and require the executive to establish
compelling reasons for non-disclosure in respect of particular items of evidence.85
It is one thing for a court to defer generally to the executive in security matters; it
is another for courts to accept the state's confidentiality claims over core elements
of its case against an individual without reviewing in detail the information and
proposed rationale for secrecy, without carefully considering options to maximise
disclosure, and without requiring the executive to choose, where necessary, either
to disclose the evidence or to accept dismissal of its relevant claims.86 A court
neglects its duty to insulate the adjudicative process from the conflict of interest
in hidden government when the court is overly compliant in accepting what was
called, by US Senator Muskie, 'the outworn myth that only those in possession of
80 R. S. Holzer, 'National Security Versus Defense Counsel's "Need to Know": An Objective Standard
for Resolving the Tension' (2005) Fordham L Rev 1941 at 1949.
81 Secretary of State for the Home Departmentv Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153. R. P. Deyling, 'Judicial Deference
and De Novo Review in Litigation Over National Security Information Under the Freedom of
Information Act' (1992) 37 Vill L Rev 67 at 69; C. D. Ablard, 'Judicial Review of National Security
Decisions: United States and United Kingdom' (1986) 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 753.
82 Narain, above n. 79 at 84.
83 S. Brown, 'Public Interest Immunity' [1994] Public Law 579 at 589.
84 Arar Report-Analysis and Recomaiendations, above n. 62 at 260 and 301-4. See above n. 61.
85 Ab~ddlah Khadr v Attorney-,eneral of Canada 2008 FC 549 at [98]. For a discussion of class claims in
public interest immunity cases, see P. Roberts and A. Zuckerman, Crirninal Evidence (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 2004) 238-40.
86 Manget, above n. 60 at 423; Salgado, above n. 77 at 436 and 442; Yaroshefsky, above n. 7 at 1088;
Leigh, above n. 8 at 154-5.
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military and diplomatic confidences can have the expertise to decide with whom
and when to share their knowledge' .Y
The mosaic theory
In terms of expertise, the terrain of inquiry in national security matters has an
especially opaque and high-stakes quality. Threats are often not clear even to
security officials and yet can easily be seen by anyone to carry potentially
catastrophic consequences. This high-stakes uncertainty provides the backdrop
for the 'mosaic theory' of non-disclosure. The theory posits that, even where appar-
ently innocuous information is disclosed, an informed observer may be able to
piece together information or combine it with other information known to the
observer in order to construct a more comprehensive picture of state secrets. 88 The
theory represents an ultra-precautionary approach to the disclosure of security
intelligence.89 It can be used to support a claim that disclosure of virtually any
evidence classified as secret by the executive will harm national security. In
Pozen's words, 'highly speculative mosaic claims are unfalsifiable; in practice,
they have proven unimpeachable'." The difficulty then is that the theory's
breadth may cause courts to defer to the state's confidentiality claims without
engaging in rigorous analysis of whether and how abstract and generalised ratio-
nales for confidentiality actually apply to specific pieces of information. In many
cases, courts have relied on the mosaic theory to support a highly deferential
approach to the state's case for secrecy."
A sceptical approach to the mosaic theory was adopted by Mosley J of Canada's
Federal Court in Khadr, which involved an application for the disclosure of infor-
mation subject to the national security confidentiality provisions of s. 38 of
the Canada Evidence Act. In Khadr, the mosaic theory was advanced by the
Attorney-General to support a confidentiality claim over various pieces of infor-
mation relevant to Mr Khadr's defence in extradition proceedings, including the
fact that Canadian officials had been informed three years earlier that US author-
ities paid a bounty to Pakistan for Mr Khadr's capture prior to his detention and
alleged abuse at the hands of US agents and Pakistani officials. Following a
detailed review, MosleyJ ordered disclosure of the information that he found to be
87 Senator Muskie, Remarks, 120 Cong Rec (daily edn May 30, 1974) §9319.
88 Abdullah KIhadr v Atornev-General of Canada 2008 FC 549 at [73].
89 D. E. Pozen, 'The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act' (2005)Yale
LJ 629 at 663-6.
90 Pozen, above n. 89 at 679.
91 For example, Henrie v Canada (Security Intelligence Review Commnittee) (1989) 53 DLR (4th) 568 at 578-9.
C. E. Wells, 'CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude' (2006) 58 Admin L Rev 845 at
863-6.
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relevant to the extradition proceeding, including the payment of the bounty. The
court found that disclosure of this fact, in particular, would not injure national
security because three years had passed since the information was received by
Canadian officials, the general practice of paying bounties was in the public
domain, no human source appeared to be at risk, and the circumstances in
Pakistan had changed since these events took place."
Most importantly for present purposes, MosleyJ concluded that the mosaic theory,
without supporting evidence, was insufficient to establish that disclosure would
injure national security. He said that '[a]s a matter of logic, the concept has some
appeal but there is no apparent limit to how far it may be taken. Carried to an
extreme, the theory would justify the withholding of all information no matter
how innocuous'." Mosley J also cautioned that '[w]itnesses from the intelligence
community may take the mosaic effect theory as an article of faith, relying upon it
as a complete answer to the release of information they consider sensitive or
potentially harmful' 4 This important ruling indicates not only the limits of the
mosaic theory as an all-encompassing rationale for confidentiality, but also the
capacity of judges to reject over-broad claims about the need for secrecy. On the
other hand, aspects of the decision in Khadr are somewhat exceptional, for reasons
discussed below.
The contest of attrition in security confidentiality review
A judge is usually in a position to release confidential information only after a
time-consuming and often testing interaction with the executive in secret." The
process of confidential document review is complex and laborious. Myriad issues
will arise in the assessment of the relevance of information to the underlying
proceeding, the potential harm arising from disclosure, and the trade-offs
between secrecy and disclosure. These issues will be multiplied by the number of
distinct pieces of information that are under consideration for disclosure. The
relationship between reasons for and against disclosure may be fluid, requiring
ongoing review as risks evolve or other information finds its way into the public
domain. The process will be cumbersome, all the more so where the executive
adopts the strategy of embroiling the judge or special advocate in a contest of
92 Abdullah Khadr v Attorney-General of Canada 2008 FC 549 at [111]. Other information relevant to
Mr Khadr's defence in the extradition proceedings was also ordered to be disclosed to him,
although not to the public, on the basis that the public interest in this restricted disclosure
outweighed the public interest in keeping it secret.
93 Abdullah Khadr vAttormey-General ofCanada 2008 FC 549 at [77].
94 Ibid.
95 C. Stracher, 'Eyes Tied Shut: Litigating for Access under CIPAin the Government's "War onTerror"'
(2003) 48 NY L Sch L Rev 173 at 179-80.
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attrition. 6 In such circumstances, there is a danger that the judge, facing a long
and arduous struggle with the executive, will be discouraged from undertaking
the meticulous scrutiny that is required to maximise disclosure."7 He or she may
be induced to opt for secrecy as the most practical way to contend with a
seemingly endless stream of objections by the executive.
The Khadr decision is encouraging in this respect, inasmuch as Mosley J ordered
extensive disclosure of information to support Mr Khadr's defence in extradition
proceedings. That said, the amount of information at stake was not overwhelm-
ing; it consisted of 266 documents comprising approximately 1,300 pages in
total.98 Mosley J expressed concern about 'the length of time that it took to
complete the review of the material for disclosure purposes' but accepted that this
was 'a function of the sensitivity of the information and insufficient resources'. He
also noted that Crown counsel in the extradition proceeding 'voluntarily
undertook to make disclosure beyond the scope of the requesting state's Record of
the Case when they recognized that there was an "air of reality" to the applicant's
claims'." Lastly, both counsel to Mr Khadr and the special advocate appointed by
Mosley J in the case were able to make relatively well-informed submissions on
disclosure because much of the information had been previously (and, according
to the Attorney-General, inadvertently) disclosed to Mr Khadr-and in one instance
to a newspaper-in the course of the extradition proceeding."' These pre-existing
revelations enhanced the adversarial character of the closed proceedings in Khadr
and may have helped to counter other pressures tending to favour secrecy.
3. Conclusion
Three weaknesses of adjudication in the face of secret evidence have been elabo-
rated: the inability of the individual to make an informed reply to the state's case,
the unique dependence of the court (and the individual) on the executive, and
the dynamic of closed hearings that tends to favour the security interest. These
limitations may be intractable, especially when secret evidence originates in
foreign-sourced information. Executive reliance on such information enmeshes
the court in a web of dependencies on persons and organisations operating
beyond its authority and, in many cases, beyond proper scrutiny by its own
security agencies. In the face of these weaknesses, various procedural adaptations
96 Deyling, above n. 81 at 94 and 108-9; P. Shenon, 'Judge Critical of Secrecy in Terror Case
Prosecution' New York Times (4 April 2003).
97 Deyling, above n. 81 at 105; Groner, 'Iran-Contra Trial Snagged on Classified Documents' Legal
Tirnes (18 April 1988) 3.
98 Abdullah KhadrvAtorne,-General of Canada 2008 FC 549 at [15], above n. 92.
99 lbid. at [121].
100 Ibid. at [18]-[19].
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may assist in ameliorating the limitations of secret evidence so long as they are
designed and evaluated in light of the full range of relevant adjudicative
weaknesses, and take appropriate account of the variable characteristics of
specific procedural contexts.
To address the absence of the individual from closed proceedings, governments in
the UK and Canada have allowed for the appointment of special advocates who are
given access to all of the information put forward by the state, and to the closed
hearings, and who are mandated to represent the individual's interests.' This
allows for a line to be drawn between the judge's role and the individual's
interests, and operates as a check against closed proceedings drifting towards
undue emphasis on secrecy.' However, special advocates cannot resolve other
weaknesses arising from secret evidence because they, like judges, are unlikely to
have the institutionalised expertise necessary to counter the executive's mastery
of security intelligence, and are similarly vulnerable to obstruction and
exhaustion in the contest of attrition over confidentiality claims.' Further,
special advocates have no 'roving commission' to scrutinise the underlying files,
compare cases in order to formulate a wider perspective, or investigate the
reliability of foreign-sourced information,"4 and so they, again like judges,
101 E. Metcalfe, "Representative but not responsible": The use of special advocates in English law'
(2004) 1(2) JUSTICE Journal 11; Constitutional Affairs Committee, above n. 9 at 56-7; Bonner,
above n. 27 at 276-7; C. Forcese and L. Waldman, Seeking Jiistice in an Unfair Process, Study
commissioned by the Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, with the support of
the Courts Administration Service (2007) <http:/iaixl.uottawa.ca/-cforcese/other/sastudy.pdf>,
accessed 16 October 2008.
102 M v Sec etary of State for the Homne Depairnent, Special Immigration Appeals Commission File No
SC!17/2002, Open Judgment (8 March 2004) at para. 10.
103 Constitutional Affairs Committee, above n. 9 at 56-7; N. Blake, Submissions before the
International Commission ofJurists Panel, UK Hearings, 25 April 2006, 1 <http://ejp.icj.org/IMGi
Blake transcript.pdf> 6-8, accessed 16 October 2008.
104 Re MB [2006] EVVrHC 1000 (Admin) at [98], where Sullivan J expressed concerns about the reliance
on special advocates in closed proceedings where the special advocate does not 'examine what
was actually known to the Secretary of State's informant, the Security Service, orwhether any of
the closed material on which the Secretary of State based his suspicion was in fact true'.
Ultimately, in Re MB [2007] UKI-IL 46, a majority of the House of Lords concluded that the use of
closed proceedings in which special advocates were employed could in many cases be made
consistent with the right to a fair hearing in a civil context under Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. However, the majority also expressed concern about the
implications for procedural fairness, with Lord Bingham in particular speaking at [35] of the
Igrave disadvantage' for the individual and of the role of the court in specific cases 'to decide,
looking at the process as a whole, whether a procedure has been used which involved significant
injustice to the controlled person'. See also at [66] (Baroness Hale) and [90] (Lord Brown). On the
appointment of special advocates in parole board hearings, see R (on the application of Roberts) v
Parole Board [2005] UKI-IL 45, [2005] 2 AC 738.
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remain dependent on the executive in its production and portrayal of confidential
information."°5
In its decision in Charkaoui No. 1, the Supreme Court of Canada discussed,
alongside the use of special advocates, the adjudicative models used by the
Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and by the Arar Inquiry to look
behind executive claims and scrutinise the underlying record." 6 Notably, both of
these alternative models allowed not only for surrogate representation of the
individual in closed proceedings but also for independent review of the execu-
tive's decisions regarding the selection and depiction of secret evidence.' The
models also have limitations, but they were in this respect better equipped than
the special advocates model to counter weaknesses arising from dependence on
the executive. In security proceedings, there is a uniquely pressing need for
independent investigation of the underlying record because the material that
makes up the secret evidence will rarely be made public to contemporaries or
otherwise scrutinised beyond the closed proceeding.
In conclusion, it should be stressed that no procedural adaptation can entirely
remove the inherent weaknesses arising from secrecy. Allowing secret evidence
poses an inescapable risk that the court may be denied vital information that can
be communicated only if the affected individual, or the public, is informed of the
evidence. Likewise, the only way to subject those operating in closed proceedings
to the disciplines of publicity is to open the proceedings. For these reasons, the
courts must always ask whether, in spite of the procedural adaptations that may
be available to accommodate secrecy, it is nonetheless irreparably unsafe or unfair
to allow it.
105 Bonner, above n. 27 at 285-6; Forcese and Waldman, above n. 101 at 40-3.
106 Above n. 31 at [70] and [87].
107 See Arar Report-Analysis and Recommendations, above n. 62 at 290-8; Leigh, above n. 8 at 140-1 and
162-3.
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